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Abstract: 
 
Purpose: This research is aimed to examine the effect of ASEAN corporate governance 
scorecard on firm value.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: Research sample consists of 491 manufacture firms listed in 
stock market of Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. ASEAN corporate 
governance scorecard is measured by dummy variable, which is big 50 and non-big 50 firm’s 
rank of highest ASEAN corporate governance scorecard. Firm value measured by Tobin’s Q.  
Hypothesis test uses country fixed-effect regression analysis. 
Findings: This research finds that the big 50 of highest ASEAN corporate governance 
scorecards have positive effect on firm value. Higher ASEAN corporate governance scorecard 
as improvement of rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of 
stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, responsibilities of the board, will improve firm’s 
value.  
Practical Implications: Management could make firm policy about optimal corporate 
governance, so management could maximizes shareholders‘ wealth by firm value increasing. 
Investors, who have interest send their investment abroad especially in ASEAN, have to see 
condition of corporate governance of public-listed firms, so investors’ wealth could be 
maximized.  
Originality/Value: This research provides early evidence about new corporate governance 
formulation, especially in ASEAN, and its effect on firm value in stock markets in ASEAN. 
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The main financial objective of a firm is to maximize owners’ wealth, in other words, 
firm’s value improvement (Kesten, 2010). In the context of public traded share firms, 
stock price indicates the firm value. Stock price describes a picture of various 
decisions and policies making where it should determines firm value as a result of 
management performance (Kesten, 2010). 
 
Conflict of interest is one of the problems that hinder the value enhancement. Conflict 
of interest between shareholders and management shows that management is less 
likely to works with the consideration of shareholders’ wealth (Gilson and Whitehead, 
2008; Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012; Chen et al., 2012). Another conflict of interest 
is conflict between majority and minority shareholders (Renders and Gaeremynck, 
2012) that shows controlling shareholders protected by their control right to perform 
abuse of power (Kesten, 2010; Cremers et al., 2016). Conflict between management 
and other stakeholders can hinder the value enhancement as well (Jensen, 2002), 
because it can decrease firm’s competitive advantages (Gregory et al., 2016). In order 
to minimize conflict of interest, corporate governance has to be implemented. 
 
Corporate governance is an internal mechanism to ensure that policies formulation, 
processes execution, and people behavior fill the needs of both main shareholders and 
other stakeholders by implementing supervision, control, and monitoring of  
management activities according to objective and integrated business practices (Man 
and Wong, 2013). Good corporate governance is needed because of the existence of 
conflict of interest. As the assumption of separation between firm ownership and firm 
management (Jensen, 2002), shareholders are not involved directly to management 
daily activities so they could not directly fulfill the aim of firm value maximization. 
In that case, shareholders need implementation of good corporate governance as 
controlling and monitoring function. Good corporate governance provides superior 
position of external marketplace commitment and legislation in order to protect 
shareholders and maintain board culture, policies, and processes health and safeguard 
(Man and Wong, 2013).  
 
The corporate governance structure manages rights and responsibilities distribution of 
various stakeholders in the system, including the board members, management, 
owners at the same time corporate governance also provide the rules and procedures 
for fair decisions making (Madhani, 2016). Further, Madhani (2016) also explains that 
good corporate governance is a guide of ethics of objective fulfillment and monitoring 
performance. In the stock market, corporate governance has roles of investor 
protections, public policy guidance (Guillen and Capron, 2016), political and legal 
structure, and public monitoring (Forti et al., 2011) to increase firm market value. 
 
ASEAN Capital Market Forum (2015) makes formulation of assessment of corporate 
governance which implemented for all listed firms in ASEAN, called ASEAN 
corporate governance scorecard. It assesses critical points of “rights of shareholders”, 
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“equitable treatment of shareholders”, “role of stakeholders”, “disclosure and 
transparency”, “responsibilities of the board” (ASEAN-Capital-Market-Forum, 
2015). Globally, ASEAN becomes strong market which take a position as third largest 
economic cooperation after NAFTA and EU (Lee and Jeong, 2016), while ASEAN 
still has problems of governance and underdeveloped market structure (Liu, 2016). 
The objective of this research is to examine the role of corporate governance on firm 
value in ASEAN countries. Novelty of this research is the use of corporate governance 
in ASEAN as one region, because ASEAN is on progress in development of one 
integrated open market business. It leads to involvement of all business participants 
across countries in ASEAN in evaluation of good corporate governance in same 
standard of one region of ASEAN. 
 
2. Literature Review 
  
2.1 ASEAN Economics Community (AEC) 
 
Coming ASEAN is a regional economic area based on ten countries with different 
economics performance. It ranges from Singapore as the biggest GDP per capita in 
ASEAN with value US$ 55,182 (top 8 from 183 of global countries in 2013) to 
Cambodia as the lowest GDP per capita in ASEAN with value US$ 1,028 (position 
of 156th from 183 of global countries in 2013) (Nikomborirak, 2015). In 1993, 
member countries of ASEAN sign the ASEAN Free Trade Area Agreement to 
minimize trade barriers among members (Nikomborirak, 2015). Further, in 2007, 
blueprint of ASEAN Economics Community (AEC) is made and in 2015, completion 
of AEC is about 90.5 percent (Yean and Das, 2015). The Blueprint consists of four 
key pillars: (1) a single market and production base; (2) a highly competitive 
economic region; (4) a region of equitable economic development; and (5) the region 
economy is fully integrated to the global economy (Nikomborirak, 2015). AEC can 
get more benefits if a single market such AEC can make external key partner (Lee and 
Jeong, 2016). AEC helps reduce business costs between ASEAN countries since 
trading barriers is also reduced. Regarding to condition of stock market, AEC makes 
stock market of each countries in ASEAN can be integrated (Lee and Jeong, 2016). It 
could improve investment flows in ASEAN as one integrated region. 
 
2.2  Corporate Governance and Firm Value 
 
Development Good Corporate Governance can mitigates conflict of interest and 
increases firm’s value (Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012), in this case, good corporate 
governance based on ASEAN corporate governance scorecard can increases firm 
value in ASEAN countries. First area of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard is 
“rights of shareholders”. This area is aimed to make sure that shareholders could use 
their rights to contribute in decision-making. In agency theory, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) suggest benefit of shareholders with large ownership have strong incentives to 




value. Shareholders have to do management monitoring, so management will less 
likely act based on their own interests and more likely act based on shareholders 
wealth and firm value increasing. Previous researches have proved that share 
ownership factors could decrease agency conflict by information asymmetric 
minimizing (Shiri et al., 2016), financing cost minimizing (Tan and Ma, 2016), and 
firm value maximizing (Wei et al., 2005; Cheung et al., 2011). Man and Wong (2013) 
shows that ownership structure can decreases conflict of interest such as the role of 
managerial ownership that can aligns interest differences between management and 
shareholders, and role of institutional ownership that have better knowledge and 
effective monitoring on management than individual ownership. Role of foreign 
ownership could increases firm value as well, by creating competitive advantages such 
as developing new markets for its assets from abroad (Gande et al., 2009), superior 
research and development of marketing production capabilities and consumer 
goodwill (Lee et al., 2015), higher labor productivity, wages, export, technological 
intensities (Rasiah and Malakolunthu, 2009; Wei et al., 2005), international manager 
talents (Wei et al., 2005), and more independent in management monitoring (Ahmed 
and Iwasaki, 2015). Since shareholders do not directly involve in daily activities of 
management, fulfillment of rights of shareholders such as ensures clear voting right, 
decision making process, approve of board selection and voting class of shares (Asian-
Development-Bank, 2016a) is important, especially in firm’s value creation. 
 
Second area of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard is “equitable treatment of 
shareholders”. This area is aimed to mitigate, conflict of principal-principal (conflict 
between majority and minority shareholders). In ownership structure there is the 
entrenchment effect. Entrenchment is the act of controlling shareholder protected by 
their control right to perform abuse of power (Kesten, 2010; Cremers et al., 2016). 
The higher ownership does not always followed by good performance, because of 
abuse of control right to meet self-interests instead of all shareholders interests. Maher 
and Andersson (1999), Man and Wong (2013) stated that corporate governance tends 
to foster a more open and equitable distribution of information and place a stronger 
emphasis on the protection of shareholders rights, in particular, those of minority 
shareholders. Corporate governance reduces the private benefits of control enjoyed by 
majority shareholders by limiting the incidence of tunnelling, asset-stripping, related-
party transactions, and other ways of diverting company assets or cash flows from 
minority shareholders (Love, 2010). Area of “equitable treatment of shareholders” 
ensures clear voting right, decision making process, approve of board selection, voting 
class of shares, and conflict of interests (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). It is a 
picture of entrenchment effect reducing of majority shareholders (Zerni et al., 2010). 
 
Third area of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard is “role of stakeholders”. This 
area covers activities related to customer welfare, communities, creditors’ rights, 
environmental sustainability, and employee safety, health, and welfare (Asian-
Development-Bank, 2016a). It is related with stakeholder theory that explains in order 
to create long-run firm value, firm has to make decision that involves interest of all 
stakeholders, such as investors, creditors, employees and community (Jensen, 2002). 
ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard and Firm Value 
 




Corporate governance which related to stakeholder is, in another word, 
implementation of business ethic and social responsibility (Gregory et al., 2016). By 
assimilating knowledge from stakeholders, firm gets skills and requires appropriate 
systems (Harrison et al., 2010) and creates value (Gregory et al., 2016; Sul et al., 
2014). Firm can increases competitive advantage and financial performance by 
supporting the role of stakeholders (Gregory et al., 2016), such as increasing  
consumer goodwill (Lee et al., 2015), higher labor productivity, wages, export, 
technological intensities (Rasiah and Malakolunthu, 2009; Wei et al., 2005). Previous 
research found that consumer goodwill (Fang et al., 2008) and technological 
investment (Mithas and Rust, 2016) could increase firm value through improvement 
of firm performance. Firm that implements corporate social responsibility can 
increase employee job satisfaction as well as increases firm value (Edmans, 2012). 
Gregory et al. (2016) stated that any firm committing in investment of social 
responsibility such as environment, community, diversity, employee relations, human 
rights, product and governance gets benefits and financial rewards. 
 
Fourth area of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard is “disclosure and 
transparency”. It is related to annual report, ensures disclosure of board activities, risk 
management, financial performance, auditing activities, whistle blowing policy, 
related party transaction, language availability and firms’ website (Asian-
Development-Bank, 2016a).  Higher disclosure and transparency will reduce 
information asymmetric (Madhani, 2016), provides domestic and english language 
(Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a; Lee et al., 2015) and disclosure of insider trading 
(Kho et al., 2009). Low information asymmetric means high annual report quality. 
High quality of reporting and disclosure can increase firm’s value (Siagian et al., 
2013). Reporting quality is related to auditing process as well, where the higher 
auditor quality the higher reporting quality (Srinidhi et al., 2012; Blay et al., 2011). 
 
Fifth area of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard is “responsibilities of the 
board”. It covers evaluation of board and its committee activities to implement good 
corporate governance (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). Since shareholders do not 
directly involve in daily firm activities, role of board is needed. Responsibilities of the 
board are related to management monitoring. As proxy of shareholders in 
management daily activities, board have important role to make sure management acts 
in line with shareholders interests (Man and Wong, 2013). Poor role of board leads to 
destroying shareholders’ wealth (Al-Maskati et al., 2015). Several characteristics of 
the board such as  the  lower number  of  inside  directors,  the  higher number  of  
directors  who can  be considered  industry  experts,  and  the  higher number  of  
directors  with  management expertise can increases firm’s value (Charitou et al., 
2016). Based on explanation in five areas of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard 
that can reduce conflict of interest as well as information asymmetric, and increases 
performance and monitoring implementation, hypothesis will be as followed. 
 




3. Methodology  
 
The research will examine the role of firms’ corporate governance based on ASEAN 
corporate governance scorecard on firm value in five countries of ASEAN, which are 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. These five countries have 
better access of data for this research than other countries of ASEAN. Data are from 
financial statements and the ASEAN capital market forum website. Financial 
statements will be accessed from the website of the stock market of five countries. 
The research sample is manufacture firms listed from 2012-2013 in stock market of 
five countries of ASEAN. Based on data available in World Bank (World-Bank, 
2016), value added of manufacture industry (contributions of manufactures industry 
to economics) of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, have been 
decrease from 2011-2013. Therefore, it is important to examine manufacture firms 
value related to foreign ownership as an effect of establishment of integrated stock 
market in ASEAN. 
 
Firms with negative book value of equity will be excluded. Negative book value of 
equity indicates insufficiency of shareholder financing on firm activities, while this 
research examines shareholders’ role on firm business activities. Insufficiency of 
shareholder financing means that there is lack of shareholders’ role on firm business 
activities because financing is dominated by creditors and indicates that role of 
creditors dominates on firm business activities. Negative book value of equity will 
make bias on Tobin’s Q measurement as well. The higher Tobin’s Q indicates higher 
firm value. Negative book value of equity will leads to high Tobin’s Q not because of 
high market value of equity but because of high domination of debt in firm financing. 
In order to avoid bias on lack of shareholders’ role on firm business activities and 
Tobin’s Q measurement, this research excludes firm with negative book value of 
equity. Based on Table 1, there are 491 firms as research sample and 982 observations.  
 
Table 1. Research Sample  
Firms in each country Total 
Indonesia Manufacture firms listed 2012-2013 
Incomplete data 





Malaysia Manufacture firms listed 2012-2013 




Philippine Manufacture firms listed 2012-2013 20 20 
Singapore Manufacture firms listed 2012-2013 




Thailand Manufacture firms listed 2012-2013 




Number of Firms 491 
Number of Observations 982 
Source: Own study. 
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The Dependent variable is firm’s value. Firm’s value could seen by market share price 
as shareholders’ wealth. Firm value measured by Tobin’s Q (Cremers and Ferrel, 
2014; Wei et al., 2005; Ahmed and Iwasaki, 2015). Consideration of using Tobin’s Q 
follows a substantial literature on the association between firm value and various 
corporate arrangements, which extensively uses Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value 
(Cremers and Ferrel, 2014). Tobin’s Q calculated by the sum of book value of 
liabilities and market value of equity divided by book value of assets (Cremers and 
Ferrel, 2014; Wei et al., 2005; Ahmed and Iwasaki, 2015): 
 
Tobin′s Q =
Book value of liabilities + Market value of euqity
Book value of assets
 
 
Independent variable is the Corporate Governance level as dummy variable. Corporate 
governance measured by rank of score of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard of 
all listed firms in five capital markets of Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia 
and Indonesia accessed in ASEAN corporate governance scorecard assessment report 
by Asian Development Bank (2016a; Asian-Development-Bank, 2016b). It shows 
rank of average corporate governance score that covers area of rights of shareholders, 
equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, 
responsibilities of the board (ASEAN-Capital-Market-Forum, 2015). If firm includes 
in big 50 of the highest ASEAN corporate governance scorecard in its country, then it 
shows firm with the highest level of good corporate governance based on ASEAN 
evaluation standard. Score 1, if firm includes in big 50 of ASEAN corporate 
governance scorecard, 0 otherwise. 
 
Control variables of firm level are foreign ownership, managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership, auditor reputation, independent board, leverage, firm size, and 
profitability. Ownership factors related to corporate governance area of “shareholders 
rights”, auditor reputation related to corporate governance area of “disclosures and 
transparency”, independent board related to corporate governance area of 
“responsibilities of the board”. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest benefit of 
shareholders with large ownership have strong incentives to monitor manager, thus 
mitigates agency conflict, that helps to maximize firm value.  
 
High auditor reputation leads to high auditor quality as well as high financial reporting 
quality (Blay et al., 2011). The more independent member of the board, the more 
effective monitoring role leads to high firm value (Charitou et al., 2016). Foreign 
managerial institutional ownership will be measured by proportion of shares owned 
by foreign management institution, which is the number of shares held by foreign 
management institution divided by the number of outstanding shares. Auditor 
reputation will be measured as a dummy variable, 1 if auditor affiliated with big four 
auditors (PricewaterhouseCooper, Deloitte, Erns&Young, KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
Independent board will be measured by the proportion of the number of independent 




Consideration of leverage, size and profitability as control variables is a triangle 
relationship of capital structure, firm size and performance determining the firm’s 
value (Muzir, 2011). Leverage is the use of debt in capital structure. Debt is a capital 
source that increases the risk associated with future earnings (Muzir, 2011), measured 
by debt to assets ratio (total of debt divided by total assets). Leverage has negative 
effect on firm value. Firm size has negative effect on firm value, because big firms 
have big political cost (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Firm size is measured by the 
value of logarithm of total assets. Profitability is firm ability to generate profit by its 
assets. Profitability has positive effect on firm value (Muzir, 2011). Profitability is 
measured with return on assets (net income after tax divided by total assets). 
 
Control variable of stock exchange level of country is the score of ASEAN Corporate 
Governance Scorecard. It will control the big 50 of firms’ ranking of ASEAN 
Corporate Governance Scorecard that has possibility of different score range within 
50 firms in each country. Even open market and integration have been established 
between countries in ASEAN, there are still unilateral liberalization initiatives in each 
individual country (Yean and Das, 2015). Each stock exchange of these countries has 
optimal standards of corporate governance. It will be measured by average country 
score of ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard (Asian-Development-Bank, 
2016a; Asian-Development-Bank, 2016b). 
 
3.1  Research Analysis Model 
 
This research will run country fixed-effect regression analysis as hypothesis test. 
Regression model is as followed: 
 
Tobin′s Qijt =  α +  β1BIG50CGijt +  β2FORijt  +  β3INSTijt +  β4MANijt
+  β5AUDITORijt +  β6BOARDijt  +  β7DARijt +  β8ROAijt
+  β9SIZEijt + β10ASEANCGjt + ∑ country 
 
Where Tobin’s Qijt is the value of firm i in country j in period t, BIG50CGijt is 1 if firm 
i in country j is in Big 50 rank of  ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard in period 
t and 0 otherwise, FORijt is the foreign ownership of firm i in country j in period t, 
INSTijt is the institutional ownership of firm i in country j in period t, MANijt is the 
managerial ownership of firm i in country j in period t, AUDITORijt is 1 if firm i in 
country j is audited by one of the big four auditors in period t and 0 otherwise, 
BOARDijt is the composition of independent board of firm i in country j in period t, 
DARijt is the debt to assets ratio of firm i in country j in period t, ROAijt is the return 
on assets of firm i in country j in period t, SIZEijt is the size of firm i in country j in 
period t, ASEANCGjt is the ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard in country j in 
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Descriptive statistics for the variables in the model are presentented in Table 2. Based 
on Table 2, the average of manufacture firm value in five countries of ASEAN is 
1.3047. The highest mean of firm value is in Philippine with 2.396, while the lowest 
is in Singapore which is 0.807. On average, corporate governance scorecard in five 
countries of ASEAN is 63.313. Indonesia has the lowest corporate governance 
scorecard with mean value 48.92, while Thailand has the highest corporate 
governance scorecard with mean value 71.525. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Based on Country 
Country Tobin’s Q FOR INST MAN BOARD DAR ROA SIZE ASEANCG 






























Source: Own study. 
 
Based on Table 3, the number of sample which includes firms in rank of big 50 of 
ASEAN corporate governance scorecard from 2012-2013 are 52, or 5.3 percent of the 
sample (sample size 982 forms). The size of sample not including firms in rank of big 
50 of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard from 2012-2013 are 930, or 94.7 
percent of all 982 firms. The average of firm value for non big 50 of ASEAN corporate 
governance scorecard is 1.183, while firm value for big 50 of ASEAN corporate 
governance scorecard is 3.473. Based on comparison tests, firm value for big 50 of 
ASEAN corporate governance scorecard is different significantly comparing to firm 
value for non big 50 of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard. Firm value for big 
50 of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard is higher than non big 50 of ASEAN 





Table 3. Descriptive Statistics Based on ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard 
Firm’s Rank Tobin’s Q# FOR INST MAN BOARD DAR ROA SIZE ASEANCG 
Non 
Big 50 















Mann-Whitney U 8,425*         
Note: *Significant in 1 percent, #Tobin’s Q is not distributed normally, so this research 
performs non-parametric test for comparison test of firm value between big 50 and non-big 50 
firm of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard, which is Mann-Whitney U test. 
Source: Own study. 
 
4.1  Hypothesis Testing 
 
Based on Table 4, firm rank of big 50 ASEAN corporate governance scorecard has 
coefficient value 2.287 (significant in 1 percent level). Analysis for each country 
shows similar result as well. Good corporate governance, seen by firm rank of big 50 
ASEAN corporate governance, increases firm value in Thailand (significant in 10 
percent), Singapore (significant in 10 percent), Philippines (significant in 5 percent), 
Malaysia (significant in 1 percent), and Indonesia (significant in 1 percent). ASEAN 
corporate governance scorecard has positive effect on firm’s value. 
 
Table 4. Main results 
Variable Coefficient 
All Thailand Singapore Philippines Malaysia Indonesia 
Constant 3.966* 5.014* 0.483 39.687* 1.893 0.434 
BIG50CG 2.287* 0.507*** 0.512*** 3.319** 4.401* 3.518* 
FOR 0.229 -1.171** 0.007 0.912 1.095*** 0.005 
INST 0.798* 1.232* 0.029 3.168*** 0.934*** -0.394 
MAN 0.552 1.410* 0.219 9.680 -0.064 -0.050 
AUDITOR 0.176 0.143 0.185** -1.428 -0.232 0.939** 
BOARD 0.210 -2.056** 0.127 -5.393 -0.336 3.770** 
DAR -0.028 0.116 0.320*** 2.557 0.219 -0.340 
ROA 0.015 0.548** 0.014 1.094 -0.272 0.100 
SIZE -0.308* -0.358 -0.004 -3.994* -0.131 -0.027 
ASEANCG 0.005      
N 982 132 234 40 416 160 
C Control Yes n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
F-Statistics 9.026* 3.419* 1.674*** 6.567* 8.764* 7.220* 
Adj. R2 0.103 0.143 0.025 0.562 0.144 0.260 
Note: *Significant in 1 %, **Significant in 5 %, ***Significant in 10 %. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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For the whole sample, institutional ownership has a positive effect on firm value 
(significant in 1 percent), while size has negative effect on firm value (significant in 
1 percent). Foreign and managerial ownership, auditor reputation, independent board, 
debt to assets ratio and return on assets have no effect on firm value. For sub-sample, 
control variables show varient results in each country. 
 
In order to ensure consistency in hypotheses test results, we can consider other 
scenarios if hypotheses test is run as other alternative tests. The research runs three 
alternative tests. First alternative is regression model with corporate governance as 
control variable. Second alternative is regression model with firm characteristics as 
control variable. Third alternative is regression model with market to book value as 
firm value measurement (Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012). Results of alternative tests 
are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Alternative Tests 





















Constant 3.966* 1.150*** 3.824* 4.894**  
BIG50CG 2.287* 1.982* 2.343* 5.327* Consistent 
FOR 0.229 0.277  1.234**  
INST 0.798* 0.674**  1.137**  
MAN 0.552 0.655  0.968**  
AUDITOR 0.176 0.072  0.478  
BOARD 0.210 0.245  1.243  
DAR -0.028  -0.149 1.267**  
ROA 0.015  0.005 0.019  
SIZE -0.308*  -0.212** -0.570*  
ASEANCG 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.010  
Dependent 
Variable 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Market to Book 
Value 
 
C Control Yes Yes Yes Yes  
F-Statistics 9.026* 10.495* 12.460* 11.962*  
Adj. R2 0.103 0.096 0.095 0.135  
Note: *Significant in 1 %, **Significant in 5 %, ***Significant in 10 % 
Source: Own study. 
 
Based on Table 5, firm rank of big 50 ASEAN corporate governance scorecard has 
coefficient value 1.15 (significant in 10 percent) for regression model with corporate 
governance factors as control variables. Firm rank of big 50 ASEAN corporate 
governance scorecard has coefficient value 3.824 (significant in 1 percent) for 
regression model with firm characteristics as control variables. Firm rank of big 50 




percent) for regression model with market to book value as dependent variable. It 
shows that results of alternative tests are consistent with main hypotheses tests. 
 
4.2  Discussion 
 
Based on data analysis, ASEAN corporate governance scorecard has a positive effect 
on firm value. It is consistent with previous researches such as Cremers and Ferrel 
(2014) and Gregory et al. (2016) that prove good corporate governance can increase 
firm’s value. It shows that in ASEAN countries, good corporate is an important factor 
to reduce conflict of interest as well as to increase firm value. 
 
Based on assessment of ASEAN corporate governance scorecard rights of 
shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholder, disclosures and 
transparency, responsibility of the board can mitigate conflict of interest and indicate 
optimal monitoring of firm management to increase firm value. Good corporate 
governance in area “rights of shareholder” shows that corporate governance 
mechanism could strengthen the role of shareholders to monitor management by 
ensuring rights of shareholders in involvement of important decision making. Good 
corporate governance in the area “equitable treatment of shareholders” shows that 
corporate governance mechanism can reduce the entrenchment effect as well as the 
abuse of power by controlling shareholders that can destroy minority shareholders’ 
wealth.  
 
Good corporate governance in area “role of stakeholders” shows that corporate 
governance mechanism can get competitive advantages by ensuring activities related 
to customer welfare, communities, creditors’ rights, environmental sustainability, and 
employee safety, health, and welfare (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a) to increase 
management performance. Good corporate governance in the area “disclosures and 
transparency” shows that corporate governance mechanism can reduce asymmetric 
information between management and external financial report by ensuring disclosure 
of board activities, risk management, financial performance, auditing activities, 
whistle blowing policy, related party transaction, language availability and firms’ 
website (Asian-Development-Bank, 2016a). Good corporate governance in area 
“responsibilities of the board” shows that corporate governance mechanism can 
increases the role of board and its committee. As proxy of shareholders in management 
daily activities, board has an important role to make sure management acts in line with 
shareholders’ interests. 
 
5. Conclusion, Limitations and Avenues for Further Research 
 
This research is aimed to examine the role of corporate governance on firm value in 
five ASEAN countries. ASEAN corporate governance scorecard has positive effect 
on firm value. Corporate governance as a function of shareholders’ protection, 
monitoring improvement, and transparency, support firm value increasing. Good 
corporate governance in areas of rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of 
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shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency and responsibilities of 
the board can mitigates conflict of interest between management with shareholders, 
employees, customer and community and leads to better firm performance and firm 
value increasing. 
 
The research has implication to management of firm, especially manufacture firm in 
ASEAN. Management could make firm policy about optimal corporate governance, 
so management could maximize shareholders’ wealth by firm value increasing. This 
research has implication to stock investor as well. Investors, who have interest send 
their investment abroad especially in ASEAN, have to see the conditions of corporate 
governance of public-listed firms, so investors’ wealth could be maximized. 
 
The research is not considering the effect of each area of ASEAN corporate 
governance scorecard as corporate governance implementation to support foreign 
shareholders’ role on firm value increasing, because of limitation access to data. 
Suggestions for future research are considered score of each area of ASEAN corporate 
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